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Abstract 
Although Budget Support (BS) was not designed to push political reform in recipient 
countries, donors have nonetheless used it to sanction democratic regress. An econometric 
analysis of all BS suspensions by bilateral donors in the period 2000-2011 finds that 
suspensions effectively do reflect downward tendencies in voice and accountability, and in 
level of democratic functioning. The larger the in-country BS donor group, the more 
suspensions. Interestingly, ideological alignment between donor and recipient and aid 
dependence decrease the likelihood for suspensions, while domestic donor economic growth 
increases it; and multilateral suspensions have the largest positive effect of all. 
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WHAT DETERMINES THE SUSPENSION 
OF BUDGET SUPPORT? 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the turn of the millennium, the aid business has witnessed an important shift in the con-
ceptualization and practice of aid delivery. The move towards harmonized and aligned ap-
proaches, including the need to make aid more predictable and flexible, introduced the Budget 
Support modality. Budget support refers to financial support to a country’s budget,  using the 
partner country’s own financial management systems and budget procedures,  thereby provid-
ing regular and flexible funding for country-led poverty reduction efforts. Budget support, for 
the recipient, involves augmenting the share of freely available resources without earmarking. 
Budget support was supposed to overcome some of the failures of the structural adjustment 
programmes. The latter mostly relied on one-off ex ante conditionality, and it forced reci-
pients to undertake unpopular policy measures (Koeberle and Stavreski 2006:4-6). Low own-
ership in combination with ex-ante disbursement schemes had proven to be ineffective (Dollar 
and Pritchett 1998). Moving towards partnership approaches and more medium term perspec-
tives on reform efforts, budget support was supposed to become a more continuous effort to 
support institutional reforms as a series of programmatic interventions, and making use of ex-
post conditionalities based on actions completed (Koeberle and Stavreski 2006). Given the 
fiduciary risks, BS was designed to be used quite selectively as a financing modality to sup-
port poverty reduction efforts. Only countries with a good policy environment and a govern-
ment demonstrably committed to poverty reduction were to be granted this flexible aid mod-
ality. The focus on poverty reduction also implied that in principle and in design BS was not 
meant to be used to induce political change (or sanction the lack of it), because the instrument 
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was considered to be unsuitable for this purpose. Indeed, the OECD/DAC guidelines clearly 
state that ‘political conditionality should not be specifically linked to Budget Support or any 
individual aid instrument, but rather should be handled in the context of the overarching polit-
ical dialogue between a partner country and its donors’(OECD/DAC, 2006, p.33). 
Yet, like in other areas of development policy, a significant gap between rhetoric and reality 
has been observed. The practice of Budget Support has strikingly diverged from design pre-
scriptions. From the outset, many donors started channeling large sums of foreign aid through 
this fashionable, new-millennium flavored aid modality without being particularly selective. 
This deviation from the blueprint ended up compromising aid effectiveness and predictability, 
forcing donors to adjust by increasingly using BS suspensions to sanction ‘potential breaches’
in their trust relationship with recipients (another deviation from the blueprint). We apply the 
term “suspension”fairly broadly –it is used to refer not only to situations where BS is with-
drawn indefinitely, but also to instances where BS transfers have been delayed, reduced or re-
channelled, provided these actions were undertaken by donors  following a ‘troubling event’
in recipient countries rather than stemming from factors exogenous to the recipient. Troubling 
events range from corruption scandals, human rights concerns or electoral fraud, to seemingly 
more prosaic onsets like the late production of a key report. What these otherwise diverse 
triggers have in common though is that they refer to a situation where BS transfers were un-
expectedly1 either cancelled outright or received later, less of, or in a different form because 
the donor felt the recipient’s performance was demonstrably lacking in some key respect, and 
applying a sanction (with varying degrees of severity) was a way to communicate this dissa-
tisfaction and press for reform (bearing in mind that frequently the conditionalities attached to 
reinstating BS went beyond the issue that triggered the suspension). Actually our data shows 
that the largest share of BS suspensions (41 %) have been political in the sense of having been 
associated with regime issues (such as electoral fraud, repression of opposition movements, 
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major human rights violations). In the same vein, corruption concerns have been raised in 
almost one third (31%) of the cases. In this work, we consider corruption to be more a “politi-
cal”than a “technocratic”issue because accountability and transparency are increasingly seen 
by the international community as central to democratic rule; moreover, corruption is a core 
component of the ‘governance turn’in development aid. This evidence thus suggests that the 
allocation and suspension of BS have been tied in with the use of political conditionalities. 
Regardless of the original policy intentions and official rhetoric, donors have been strategical-
ly using Budget Support in reference to and as lever for political change (Hayman, 2011; Mo-
lenaers, Cepinskas & Jacobs, 2010; Faust, Leiderer & Schmitt, 2012).  
In this context, this article is motivated by the relative paucity of scientific research into the 
dynamics of Budget Support in the light of wider debates about political conditionality. We 
attempt to contribute to the new generation of research on political conditionalities by focus-
ing on a specific, but critical phase of the budget-support process: the logic and drivers of BS 
suspensions. To our knowledge, this is the very first attempt to empirically document the pre-
valence and assess the determinants of BS suspensions. By drawing on a new dataset (con-
structed by one of the authors) which documents episodes of BS suspensions2 and reporting 
the first empirical results on their likely drivers, we seek to stimulate further research in this 
area.  
The empirical effort is supported by the integration of two established scholarly traditions: the 
literature on economic sanctions and the literature on aid allocation. In relation to the former, 
we propose that studying BS suspensions as a subset of aid sanctions may have analytical 
payoffs. Although the literature on economic sanctions and the development literature on 
Budget Support understandably rely on distinctive rhetoric (the language of coercion and 
power in the former, the language of partnership and political dialogue in the latter), the is-
sues at stake are strikingly similar. For this reason, we are confident our work may contribute 
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not to only to the debate on the logic and effectiveness of Budget Support, but also to the 
buoyant literature on economic statecraft. The engagement with the aid-allocation literature is 
more straightforward. The idea is to test whether the factors shaping the allocation and sus-
pension of aid are actually the same or not. In addition to the literatures on economic sanc-
tions and aid allocation, we have examined a number of case studies in order to identify po-
tential omitted variables and uncover some of the causal complexity underlying BS suspen-
sions. Due to space limitations, the four case studies are not fully presented here; we only 
concentrate on the key variables informing our model specification.       
Looking at BS suspensions specifically rather than aid suspensions more generally have both 
analytical and empirical merits. To start with, aid suspensions, in which the donor withdraws 
all aid, do not occur that frequently. In fact, only gross human rights violations or coup d’états 
on the recipient side have pushed donors into a full exit strategy3. This has contributed to the 
impression that donors are too lax with regards to less drastic economic and political instances 
of noncompliance; that aid is given and sustained too uncritically; that donors are not commit-
ted to the values, norms and goals they defend so vigorously in their discourse. But preva-
lence is not our only concern. We also believe that (total) aid suspensions do not fully capture 
donor practices, because more substantive variation in sanctioning behavior is both theoreti-
cally possible and empirically observed. Moreover, our paper shows that in the last decade 
donors have been very active in sanctioning (perceived) underperformance (albeit often in a 
misplaced way). Furthermore, as suggested, our data suggest that “political”considerations 
tend to be the trigger of BS suspensions. The salience of political motivations in a context 
where technocratic considerations are meant to prevail is strong evidence of the resurgence of 
political conditionality in the new institutional setting of aid. In this regard, the study of BS 
suspensions may constitute a crucial case for examining the logic of politically conditioned 
aid. Looking specifically at modality suspensions provides a very good overview of more 
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‘nuanced’forms of aid sanctioning. Where full aid exit often implies the end of the aid rela-
tionship, other forms of sanctioning –such as BS suspension –indicate a strong signal from 
the donor to the recipient: it implies a breach in the trust relationship4, a warning to the in-
cumbent government to address the issues at stake, an invitation to negotiate measures so as 
to correct what has been going wrong through the political and/or policy dialogue. Suspen-
sions of this kind therefore go hand in hand with conditionalities, sometimes negotiated and 
consensual, which may be arrived at without reaching the public arena and therefore invisible 
to both the wider public and the research community.  
The added value of this paper thus lies in the fact that it is a very first attempt to quantitatively 
identify which variables push a donor towards suspending BS. In order to do this, we made 
use of a dataset which captures all BS commitments during the period 2000-20115. We then 
introduced into this dataset an original variable constructed by us that indicates whether a 
donor decided to suspend BS in a recipient country in a given year, including in our search 
both cases where the reason for suspension was a politically troubling event (political mean-
ing related to a deterioration in democratic functioning, respect for human rights, corruption 
trends) or something else (economic underperformance, off track with IMF, etc). As men-
tioned previously, this suspension variable captures a range of sanctioning behaviors on the 
part of the donor including delaying, reducing or re-channelling BS. Empirical results from 
estimating a linear probability model indicate that progressive donors are more likely to sus-
pend BS, that a multilateral suspension increases the likelihood of bilateral suspensions; and 
that donor growth, similarity between donor and recipient, the number of BS donors, trade 
flows, the level of recipient country democracy, trends in voice and accountability, aid depen-
dence and recipient per capita GDP all matter for BS suspensions. These results are robust to 
alternative estimation methods, the inclusion of country fixed-effects, sample restrictions and 
the use of an alternative dependent variable. Focusing specifically on suspensions related to 
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political factors, progressive donors and trade flows are no longer significantly associated 
with budget support suspensions while deterioration in government effectiveness leads to 
more suspensions. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section we review the litera-
ture in order to identify the variables which might influence BS suspensions. In section 3 we 
review the data and elaborate on the regression model used, followed by a discussion of our 
empirical results. The final section of the paper draws some conclusions and identifies further 
avenues for research.  
2. WHAT FACTORS MAY PUSH SANCTIONING BEHAVIOR? 
In this section, we provide an analytical account of the potential factors driving the suspen-
sion of Budget Support by donors. We firstly draw ideas from the International Relations (IR) 
scholarship on economic sanctions and secondly discuss key findings from research on aid 
allocation. We then complement the discussion with insights from a set of case studies con-
ducted by the authors. The case studies are not fully exposed here –we only concentrate on 
the variables supporting model specification. Taken together, these three sources inform the 
empirical analysis conducted in the following section.      
(a) Economic sanctions, motivations to punish 
Inspired by the seminal work of Galtung (1967), scholars have developed a fertile research 
program on the logic and effects of economic sanctions. Initially, the literature mainly fo-
cused on whether economic sanctions would provide a viable alternative to military interven-
tion. Over time, however, the research agenda has incorporated the wide range of foreign pol-
icy tools that may be used as instruments of ‘economic statecraft’(Baldwin, 1985), including 
the suspension of aid. More recently, the literature has moved into the analysis of ‘smart sanc-
tions’, consciously designed to hurt key elites rather than the target country’s mass public 
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(Drezner, 2011). Our work on Budget Support suspensions –a subtype of economic sanction 
in its own right –can be informed by and contribute to this growing sanctions scholarship. 
Economic sanctions are often defined as ‘the deliberate, government-inspired withdrawal, or 
threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial relations’ (Hufbauer, Schott & Elliot., 
1990) and as with Budget Support suspensions they are employed in situations where a breach 
has occurred ostensibly owing to “troubling”courses of action on part of the sanctionee. In 
the IR jargon, sanctions are actions initiated ‘by one or more international actors (the “send-
ers”) against one or more others (the “receivers”) and existing models of sanction imposition 
assume that sanctions may be imposed for a variety of reasons, though two conceptually dis-
tinct categories can broadly be discerned. The more common understanding is that the sender 
wishes to “punish the receivers by depriving them of some value and/or to make the receivers 
comply with certain norms the senders deem important” (Galtung, 1967, p. 379). This is 
known as the instrumental theory of sanctions which contends that the main purpose of sanc-
tions is ‘to bring about policy change in the target nation through imposing the severest possi-
ble economic harm’(Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1988, p. 786). However, the sender’s sanc-
tioning behavior can alternatively be understood as an attempt to allay domestic political con-
cerns in the sender’s country (Davis & Engerman, 2003, p. 190). This expressive (also called 
symbolic) theory of sanctions suggests that ‘sanctions might have an altogether different goal 
–namely, to serve the interests of pressure groups within the sender country’(Kaempfer and 
Lowenberg, 1988, p. 786). Although these goals are obviously not mutually exclusive, this 
analytical scheme has forced researchers to be more explicit about the underlying politics 
behind the extensive use of economic sanctions. If the problem is framed as a bargaining 
game in which the sender seeks to extract concessions from the target by using the sanction as 
leverage (Nooruddin, 2002, p. 68), a range of economic and institutional factors may exert an 
influence on the observed pattern of sanctions, including the degree of proximity and interde-
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pendence, the relative ex-ante leverage and credibility of the sender, the regime type of the 
sender and the target, the geopolitical context, and the level of international coordination 
(Martin, 1993; Nooruddin, 2002; Lektzian & Souva, 2007).  
(b) Aid Allocation, modality selectivity and the logic of suspensions 
Aid allocation studies produce insights on donor motivations for providing aid. The elements 
that motivate a donor to provide aid in the first place might also influence their willingness to 
withdraw (parts of) that aid. For this reason it is important to consider these variables for our 
model.    
 
Allocation, which refers to the country choice donors make and the aid volumes they commit 
to each of these countries, is influenced by both donor interests (DI) and recipient needs 
(RN). These were summarized by Clist (2011) under the four Ps: proximity, population, poli-
cy and poverty.  
Donor interests such as trade and commercial interests, historical factors such as colonial ties, 
and strategic concerns do influence aid allocation. In line with the sanctions literature, this 
reflects the ideas of proximity and interdependence which influence the willingness/ability to 
sanction since sanctions may hurt the sender as well as the target. One would expect the donor 
not to sanction when significant trade interests and strategic concerns are at stake, since those 
interests tend to take precedence over other concerns. On the other hand, when significant 
interests are at stake, donors may be more likely to use sanctions to direct recipient countries 
towards preferred behavior. Whether we would expect colonial ties to increase or decrease the 
likelihood to sanction is also unclear. Another element to take into account on the donor side 
is the economic situation. With a slacking economy in the donor country, aid cuts might hap-
pen more readily as the perceived costs of helping the poor increases. But there is an alterna-
tive explanation: relative economic affluence in donor countries may favor the use of sanc-
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tions on purely expressive grounds, as societies are more sensitive to and willing to defend 
post-material values (e.g. gender equality, minority rights). In general, DIs have surfaced 
prominently as a determining factor in explaining aid allocation (see for example Alesina & 
Dollar, 2000; Berthelemy, 2006) but it remains to be seen if they are also determinant in the 
case of withdrawing BS. The role of multilaterals may also be of importance. A number of 
donors, especially the smaller ones, require a multilateral to be providing BS before they are 
allowed to do so in terms of their procedures. Due to risk management and efficiency consid-
erations, these donors then defer to the multilateral on major decisions –including then, pre-
sumably, suspension decisions. 
Recipient needs relate to factors such as poverty levels. It has been argued that poverty levels 
should be the determining factor for aid allocation so as to ensure that aid goes to those coun-
tries that need it most (Collier and Dollar, 2002). But how might this relate to aid sanctions in 
general or BS suspensions in particular? It is conceivable that donors might become either 
more or less reactive to ‘troubling events’in relation to a given trend in poverty6. If poverty 
levels are in decline, but a troubling event takes place, donors might react strongly because 
they feel that the time has come to look beyond the more narrow socio-economic develop-
ment goals. Alternatively they might refrain from sanctioning in order not to interrupt the 
growth dynamics in the recipient country or the legitimacy of the economically well perform-
ing government. The same goes for worsening poverty rates. When a troubling event occurs, 
donors might want to send a strong signal that they do not accept the way things are going, or, 
conversely, they might consider stability more important and therefore refrain from inflicting 
economic and social damage in the form of a Budget Support suspension.   
 
Beyond poverty rates and tendencies other recipient-side elements which might motivate BS 
suspensions relate to regime type and institutional setup. The World Bank’s ‘Assessing Aid’
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for instance proved influential in getting donors to take on board the idea that aid is more ef-
fective in good policy environments (World Bank, 1998; Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Collier & 
Dollar, 2002)7. Added to this, democracies spend their aid money more effectively than auto-
cracies (Svensson, 1999). Findings of this kind have resulted in (a wide variety of) allocation 
policies whereby –depending on the donor –the quality of governance has a major influence 
on aid allocation decisions. Determining governance quality can range from assessing reci-
pient systems (public sector quality), to assessing the quality of recipient policies, including 
some regime issues –notably, the quality of democracy, human rights, political stability, de-
gree of ethnic fractionalization, etc.  
Clist, Isopi and Morrissey (2012) argue that the quality of recipient policy is of particular im-
portance in understanding the choice of aid modality. They argue that BS, when given uncon-
ditionally, is the most flexible form of aid because once disbursed the donor has little to no 
control over its use. This loss of control implies that the donor needs to be able to trust the 
recipient government, and the quality of policies and/or track record of the government can be 
a hugely important factor in deciding whether or not to give (a larger proportion of their aid in 
the form of) BS. Their study looks into the selectivity criteria for BS for the European Com-
mission (EC) and World Bank and comes to the conclusion that indeed governments with 
better public expenditure monitoring, allocation mechanisms and better service delivery re-
ceive more Budget Support. A mapping carried out by the EC (2010) also shows that a num-
ber of bilateral donors consider political regime aspects before granting BS. Some of these 
donors also consider the sustainability of the partnership and the quality of policy/political 
dialogue with the recipient government. Finally, there are also differences between donors 
with regards to the benchmarks used for all these recipient characteristics. Some use hard 
benchmarks with minimum thresholds while others mainly look at tendencies over time (Mo-
lenaers et al., 2010). We would expect all these considerations to play a role in deciding 
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whether or not BS is suspended. We would thus expect that a decline in governance quality 
(systems, policies, regime) in combination with a troubling event would push a donor to sus-
pend BS more readily than would otherwise have been the case, whereas upward tendencies 
in governance quality may be expected to have the opposite effect, i.e. ceteris paribus reduce 
the willingness of donors to suspend BS. 
(c) Case studies, digging deeper into factors underlying suspensions 
We have examined four country cases (Ethiopia, Rwanda, Malawi and Uganda8) where sever-
al BS suspensions have taken place and where at least one of the ‘troubling’events was re-
lated to political regime issues (human rights, elections, etc). The selection of these cases was 
additionally motivated by the fact that in contrast to many of the other observations contained 
in our dataset, for these countries qualitative studies on the suspensions which took place 
there are readily available. We were therefore able to build on these country studies to further 
identify variables which need to be taken up to complete our model. The most documented 
cases with regards to BS suspensions are Ethiopia (e.g. Abbink, 2006; Dom & Gordon, 2011; 
Borchgrevink, 2008; Hackenesch, 2011; Aalen & Tronvol, 2008; Furtado & Smith, 2007; de 
Renzio, 2006; Hayman, 2011), Rwanda (e.g. Beswick, 2011; Schmidt, 2011; Hayman 2011), 
Uganda (Cammack, 2007; Hayman, 2011; DfID, 2005; de Renzio, 2006; Fisher, 2011; 
Dijkstra, de Kemp & Bergkamp, 2012; Tangri & Mwenda, 2006), and Malawi (e.g. Resnick, 
2012; DfID, 2012a, 2012b, 2013). The important variables arising from these cases can be 
clustered according to two main themes, which are explained in what follows.  
Expressive motivations for suspending BS: In all four cases, convincing evidence is presented 
which points to donors using BS suspensions to ‘save themselves’. In the cases of Rwanda, 
Ethiopia and Uganda, various authors argued that donors suspended Budget Support not be-
cause they felt that this would have an impact on the government, but rather to soothe public 
opinion at home (Fisher, 2011; Borchgrevink, 2008; Hayman, 2011). However, in Malawi 
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and Uganda the opposite tendency could be observed in the sense that donors on occasion 
refrained from employing BS suspensions, because they themselves did not want to be seen as 
having made a poor choice of partner country. Since expressive motivations vary according to 
how aid policy is perceived by home constituencies, this points to the need to be sensitive to 
public opinion dynamics on the donor side. From a theoretical point of view, as highlighted 
above, the influence of public support for aid can work both ways: it can either push aid agen-
cies to suspend BS because citizens do not want aid to be spent badly (and this is a particular 
risk for BS), or, it can induce non-suspension due to the Samaritan’s dilemma and/or warm 
glow effects (Gibson et al., 2005) that influence public opinion (and concomitantly lobbying 
efforts) in relation to aid-giving.  
Donor landscape issues: Budget Support goes hand in hand with donor coordination efforts, 
and the popular donor saying ‘everybody likes to coordinate, but nobody wants to be coordi-
nated’points to some interesting collective action problems we need to look into. First, the 
number of donors matters. Knack & Smets (2013) show that the number of donors needs to be 
taken into account in understanding donor decisions. Visibility concerns may push BS sus-
pensions. A further consideration is how “progressive” the donor is. The likeminded donors 
(also referred to as the Nordic+) have often been referred to as the progressive coalition. In-
itially, they were considered quite forward-thinking and flexible in giving BS, but over the 
last few years cracks in that coalition have become visible. Beswick (2011, p. 1922) argues 
that in Rwanda the coalition of the ‘likeminded’was broken in that the UK position was fun-
damentally different from the Netherlands and Sweden. The latter two countries have given 
more weight to political governance concerns, while the UK has long not wanted to cut Budg-
et Support in order to retain some degree of influence over Rwanda's overall trajectory (Bes-
wick, 2011, p.1923). Nonetheless, the Nordic+ factor might be relevant so we will include it 
in our model.   
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A final factor related to donor landscape issues, and which has been highlighted as particular-
ly important for BS, is the structure of the aid agency (existence of an implementing agency) 
and the level of decentralization (see Faust, this volume; see Winckler, Andersen & Therkild-
sen, 2007). Since no data exists on these factors, however, we are unable to take up these va-
riables in our model. 
 
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
(a) The dataset 
In the period 2000-2011 we have identified 55 ‘troubling events’which in total triggered 131 
suspensions by different donors. Of the 55 breaches, at least 22 were directly linked to politi-
cal issues such as elections and human rights concerns while about 15 were linked to corrup-
tion cases. Table 1 in the appendix shows some basic information on our dataset of suspen-
sions including the number and share of suspensions per donor as well as per recipient. DfID 
(the UKಬs Department for International Development) is the donor that has suspended most 
frequently, followed by Germany, the EU and the Netherlands. In Tanzania, four events trig-
gered no less than 17 suspensions of which the bulk relates to the major corruption scandal in 
2008. In Ethiopia the identified suspensions were all linked to the events surrounding the 
2005 elections. At a more general level, the frequency with which BS suspensions occur does 
seem to suggest that donor threats may be more credible than they are widely believed to be9.  
(b) Data, variables and model 
Budget Support suspensions are our key outcome of interest. The conceptualization and mea-
surement of this specific subset of aid sanctions is not without problems. The case studies 
clearly show that the term BS suspension can cover a wide range of actions. It can mean that a 
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donor decides to stop with this aid modality in a given country, for an indefinite period of 
time, but it can also mean that (a part of) BS is re-channeled to other modalities. It can mean 
that a donor decides to (drastically) reduce its BS envelope, or that BS disbursements are de-
layed. Moreover, both the case studies and the academic literature on sanctions suggest that 
suspension ‘threats’may be substantively important. Ideally the coding of the dependent va-
riable should reflect this variety of strategies including a diversification in terms of suspended 
volumes and the duration of the suspension. Given that this detailed, nuanced data is not yet 
available, we have pragmatically decided to rely on a simple, but intuitively plausible opera-
tionalization: the BS dummy basically measures whether a particular donor decided to sus-
pend Budget Support in a particular recipient country in a given year.   
It should be stressed that constructing our dataset on BS suspensions has involved a substan-
tive research effort, not least because governments have not usually been forthcoming and 
transparent in reporting this behavior. Hence, the information has been drawn from a variety 
of sources, including online news bulletins, donor reports/evaluations, and peer-reviewed ar-
ticles. General search terms relevant to the object of enquiry were used initially but these were 
then refined if sufficient details on the specifics of individual breaches could be found, and as 
many independent sources as possible were drawn upon. However, refinement was not always 
possible as many of these sources do not go into a great deal of detail on the specifics of the 
event and indeed, it is not unlikely that there may be a number of suspensions that remain 
unaccounted for10. Another important caveat related to the completeness and representative-
ness of our dataset is that since we only have been able to capture the actions of those donors 
that have publicly reported on their BS suspensions, our results might be biased towards the 
more transparent donors.11 That being said, our data collection has been as exhaustive as poss-
ible taking into account data limitations and the scarcity of previous empirical research. If 
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anything, this newly assembled dataset has allowed us to estimate the very first models of BS 
suspensions.  
In order to examine which donor and recipient factors determine the suspension of Budget 
Support, we have estimated the following equation: 
	
    	  	  
  	
  	
	 	
  
  	
 																		1
where suspensionijt is coded 1 if donor i decides to suspend Budget Support in recipient coun-
try j at year t.  The model includes an extensive set of regressors: a dummy for likeminded 
donors and –in an attempt to approximate the importance of home constituencies –an index 
for public support for aid in the donor country as donor varying regressor Xi ; ethnic fractiona-
lization as a recipient varying regressor Xj ; a dummy coded 1 if a colonial tie exists between 
donor i and recipient j (Xij); donor government ideology and donor economic growth as re-
gressors that vary by donor and year (Xit); the total number of Budget Support donors, a vari-
able reflecting the level of democracy, the logarithm of population and GDP per capita, the 
trend12 in government effectiveness, political stability, voice and accountability and corrup-
tion as regressors that vary by recipient and year but are donor-invariant (Xjt);13 aid over GNI 
and share of aid as Budget Support a recipient receives (Xjt-1), both lagged one year to address 
reverse causality concerns;donor i’s share in the total amount of aid recipient j receives at 
year t and the logarithm of total trade between donor i and recipient j, both lagged one year 
for reasons of reverse causality (Xijt-1); a dummy coded 1 if donor i and recipient j have the 
same ideology at year t (Xijt);  and year fixed-effects (Yt).  Note that all multilateral observa-
tions were dropped as a number of the included donor variables do not exist for multilaterals 
(e.g. donor economic growth, similar ideology).14 However, to investigate the influence of 
multilateral agencies on donor suspending behavior, we included a dummy coded one if a 
multilateral donor (EU, World Bank, IMF, African Development Bank or Inter American 


Development Bank) suspended budget support in recipient j at year t. Table 2 in the appendix 
provides a full list of the variables used and their relevant dataset sources (note that both DI 
and RN are well represented in this list) while Table 3 provides some basic descriptive statis-
tics. 
We began by estimating equation 1 as a linear probability model, correcting standard errors 
for non-independence within donor-recipient clusters.15 Coefficient estimates were obtained 
using 1053 observations covering the years 2000 through 2011. Next, we have also estimated 
two separate models, one focusing more on recipient-country variables and a second focusing 
more on donor-country variables. In the former model we replaced all donor-related variables 
by donor-fixed effects. We estimated the ‘recipient-factors’model both as a linear probability 
model and as a conditional fixed-effects logistic regression. In the ‘donor-factors’model we 
replaced all recipient and recipient-year varying covariates by recipient-fixed effects. Again 
we estimated a linear probability model and a logistic model. We performed two additional 
robustness tests. First, we estimated equation 1 dropping from the sample all observations 
related to 2005, the year with the highest number of budget support suspensions.16 Second, we 
estimated our base model with an alternative dependent variable. We presented our dataset to 
the OECD/DAC with the request to check with all DAC donors if the listed suspensions (as 
we defined them) were correct. In eight cases a conflict occurred between donor cross-check 
and the available information (most likely due to misinterpretation of our definition). In the 
second robustness test these cases were dropped from the sample. As part of this research 
focuses on political suspensions, we redid these exercises dropping from the sample all sus-
pensions related to macroeconomic and administrative breaches. In the next subsection we 
discuss our empirical findings. 
(c) Empirical findings 


Empirical results are presented in Table 4. Equation 1 shows the findings of the base model 
and indicates that multilateral donors exert a large influence: other things equal, bilateral do-
nors are 45 per cent more likely to suspend budget support in case a multilateral agency also 
suspends, a result significant beyond the one per cent level. Table 4, equation 1 also shows 
that progressive donors are on average 4.2 per cent more likely to suspend budget support. In 
addition, an extra BS donor increases the probability of suspension with 0.5 per cent on aver-
age (p-value: 0.049). Furthermore, donor economic growth comes in significantly positive: a 
one per cent growth spurt makes donors 1.8 per cent more likely to suspend BS, holding other 
factors fixed. Also trade flows are positively associated with BS suspensions, though only 
with minor quantitative effects. On the other hand, Table 4 indicates that ideological align-
ment between donor and recipient results in fewer suspensions: a similar ideology decreases 
the probability of suspending budget support with 3.6 per cent on average. Furthermore, a one 
point increase in the trend of voice and accountability reduces the probability of BS suspen-
sion with 7.4 per cent on average.17 Finally, aid dependent, democratic, poorer and more po-
pulated and countries are less likely to be sanctioned, but coefficient estimates suggest that 
quantitative effects are small. Note also that some of the usual suspects such as colonial ties, 
trend in corruption and ethnic fractionalization do not seem to play a significant role in driv-
ing suspensions.18 
- Table 4 around here - 
These observed patterns deserve some explanation. The importance of the multilateral dummy 
can be related to two things. First, as referred to earlier, some donors only give BS if a multi-
lateral is providing BS as well. If a multilateral suspends, this thus may influence bilaterals. 
But of course this implies a causality which we cannot substantiate at this point because it is 
not clear whether the bilaterals take the lead in suspending or the multilateral agencies. 
Second, given the political sensitiveness of BS, and the political pressure on bilateral donors, 
	

which is less of an issue for multilaterals, we would expect multilaterals to only sanction 
when the situation in a recipient country is quite problematic: like when a country goes off-
track, or the government uses unconstitutional means to get/stay in power.    In such cases, 
bilaterals will surely suspend as well. Here too the direction of causation however requires 
further research. Most importantly, the clear responsiveness of sanctions to deteriorations in 
voice and accountability confirms that the use of BS, contrary to the original policy blueprint, 
has effectively become entangled with political dynamics. The evidence suggests that donors 
actually use aid sanctions to punish or prevent democratic regress and/or human rights viola-
tions. The significance of the political proximity variable, measured in terms of the ideologi-
cal affinity between donors and recipients, not only confirms the findings of a recent study 
carried out by Dreher, Minasyan & Nunnenkamp (2013), but is also consistent with the ‘poli-
ticization’of Budget Support. In this regard, the ‘negative’ finding regarding corruption, a 
highly salient variable in qualitative case studies and media reports on BS suspensions, is also 
suggestive. One possibility is that donors, under pressure from domestic constituencies (in-
cluding the media), may use corruption scandals as a pretext, a focal point, to punish non-
compliance with other policy and/or political commitments. But another possibility is mea-
surement error: aggregate corruption indices may not be capturing idiosyncratic, high-profile 
corruption scandals.  
The behavior of the political economy variables is also interesting. The positive sign and sig-
nificance of donor growth indicates that, contrary to some expectations, suspensions are more 
likely when donor countries are experiencing economic affluence rather than hard times. This 
suggests that expressive motivations based on post-material values may be at work. The fact 
that Nordic Plus countries suspend more may point in this direction. The non-significance of 
colonial ties, correspondingly, seems to confirm the mixed incentives embedded in historical 
legacies. Such proximity may in some cases heighten sensitiveness and the urge to sanction, 



yet it may in other cases –due to the long standing relationship –keep donors from sanction-
ing. The fact that different forces can pull in opposite directions thus probably explains the 
non-significance of colonial ties in the matter of BS suspension. Aid dependence, a crucial 
variable on the recipient side, appears to have a moderating effect on suspensions, implying 
that either donors are more flexible/open- minded in these cases or recipients are more willing 
to accommodate external demands before an actual suspension takes place. Most likely these 
two processes are to some extent self-reinforcing: aid dependence forces recipients to listen 
more carefully to donor concerns reducing the likelihood that donors will actually suspend.        
 One way to explain the positive relationship between the number of donors and suspensions 
is to consider the development benefits of providing budget support as a common pool re-
source (Knack & Smets, 2013). That is, the more budget support donors that are active in a 
country, the more diffused the encompassing interest in a country's development. Further-
more, donors also have `private’objectives, such as reputational concerns toward home con-
stituencies (Birdsall, 2005). Taking a strong stand when things go wrong in a recipient coun-
try provides donors with an opportunity to raise their visibility. When many BS donors are 
present, those visibility concerns might trump the (already diffused) encompassing interest, 
leading to more suspensions. 
Equations 3 through 7 of Table 4 present the regression estimates from the robustness tests we 
performed. Generally, the results from the base model are confirmed: the Nordics, multilateral 
influence, donor growth, trade flows and the number of BS donors are positively associated 
with budget support suspensions while similar ideology, democracy, positive trends in voice 
and accountability, poverty, large populations and aid dependence lead to fewer suspensions. 
Note however that recipient GDP per capita comes in significant only in three out of the seven 
specifications, and population only in two. Also, in equation 6 –when 2005 is dropped from 
the sample –donor public support for aid comes in significantly negative (at the five percent 


level), indicating that donors suspend less when their home constituency takes a more favora-
ble stance towards aid.  
As suggested above, it is highly surprising that the colonial tie variable, which has been iden-
tified as a major dimension in allocation studies (Berthelemy 2006), remains insignificant 
across all specifications. At first glance, this (negative) finding defies the expectation of the 
economic sanctions literature which suggests that ex-colonial powers may be more inclined to 
use suspensions for expressive purposes. This argument is that donor home constituencies are 
more sensitive towards events in former colonies, and therefore donor governments react 
more forcefully to those events (to lower pressure from interest groups). This is what Clist 
(2011) would refer to as the proximity variable coming in. Yet, counterarguments are also 
plausible. Proximity may imply, as the sanctions literature also suggests, that pulling the plug 
may be costly for donors, in both economic and reputational terms. On the other hand, it is 
equally plausible that donors with substantial trade/economic interests in a given recipient 
country would be keen to get the recipient back on track following the problematic events in 
question so as not to jeopardize trade relations (Eaton and Engers, 1992). Aid sanctions would 
in that case be used ದ instrumentally ದ to try to alter recipient behavior or policies, and possi-
bly as a precursor to more severe sanctions in other domains (Dashti-Gibson, Davis and Rad-
cliff, 1997). 
What is overridingly clear, however, is that the way historical ties, political proximity, eco-
nomic interests, and even media and public opinion dynamics interact in shaping donors’in-
centives to suspend BS deserves further scrutiny.  
Table 5 shows the empirical results from a restricted sample of suspensions related to political 
factors.  
- Table 5 about here - 


By and large, these models tend to confirm the results of the unrestricted sample.  Specifical-
ly, the deterioration in the trend of voice and accountability, the number of donors, multilater-
al influence and donor economic growth have a positive effect on political suspensions, while 
aid dependence, ideological proximity, recipient GDP per capita and democracy have a mod-
erating effect. The most significant negative findings, regarding colonial ties, trade and ethnic 
fractionalization, also stand unchanged. Some of the results are different, though. When it 
comes to strictly political suspensions, the Nordic Plus and trade variables do not seem to 
matter a great deal. Could it be that Nordic Plus donors have been more consistent in connect-
ing BS with poverty reduction efforts and less with political issues? This remains an unans-
wered question. Deterioration in government effectiveness leads to more BS suspensions 
which seems to suggest that such suspensions, even though the trigger might be a political 
troubling event, probably also harbor some discontent regarding government performance in 
other areas. 
 
4. DISCUSSION 
 
Building on a newly assembled dataset, this article provides the very first attempt to quantita-
tively weigh the determinants of Budget Support suspensions. The good news is that such a 
measurement is actually possible and that interesting findings surface from the regression 
exercises. Most of the studies referring to BS suspensions highlight the complex nature of 
what drives donor decisions. Our research findings point in a similar direction although a 
number of variables consistently come out as more important. Multilateral influence, the dy-
namics of voice and accountability, democratic performance, ideological proximity, the num-
ber of donors, aid dependence, and donor economic growth tend to be associated with BS 


suspensions. On the other hand, some of our ‘non-findings’regarding ethnic fractionalization, 
colonial ties and corruption raise a number of intriguing questions. We should also highlight 
that the very fact that Budget Support suspensions have actually taken place and that this be-
havior has been clearly tied to underlying political developments (hence the significance of 
voice and accountability and political proximity) is clear evidence of the resurgence of politi-
cal conditionalities in the new institutional setting of aid. 
If anything, our main aspiration is to promote further research on this relatively understudied 
issue. This may include, of course, refinements in the conceptualization and measurement of  
our dependent variable, taking into account the different suspension strategies so as to better 
detect which elements drive a delay (and its duration), a rechanneling (how much control is 
the recipient compelled to give up), a full or partial abandonment of BS. Additionally, in or-
der to fully capture the dynamics of the interaction between donors and recipients, the elusive 
problem of suspension threats –which raises pervasive credibility issues – should also be 
accounted for. It would furthermore be illuminating to have better data on a number of ele-
ments including: the pressure of home constituencies and how they feel/think about BS and 
conditionalities; the relationship between media coverage and suspensions; and the quality of 
the policy/political dialogue.  
The findings of our research also give rise to a significant number of interesting new research 
questions.  Further study may for instance be able to shed more light on the expressive dimen-
sion of BS suspensions. Another fruitful research topic might reconstruct the dynamics be-
tween BS suspension ‘leaders’and ‘followers’, or the so called bandwagon or domino-effect. 
Who are the leaders in suspending, and who are the followers? Does donor size matter in 
leading or following? Finally, deepening the analysis of the relationship between the nature of 
the ‘troubling’event that triggered the political crisis and how that relates to the variables that 


prove significant may provide key insights into the deeper dynamics at play during suspen-
sion episodes.   
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ENDNOTES
                                               
1
 Note we do not consider situations where recipients do not meet the performance milestones which trigger 
further disbursements to be suspensions as here the sanction applied (non-disbursement) results from the routine 
application of a previously agreed procedure, rather than from an unforeseen event.
2
For more on how we constructed this dataset, see section 3 (b).
3
 On the donor side, a change in government preferences with regards to partner countries might also lead to an 
exit strategy. Some donors also exit when a recipient country graduates from the low income category. 
4
 In a sense this is a mutual breach in the trust relationship: from the recipient side donor promises of (in-year) 
predictable flows have fallen away, and from the donor side recipient promises of upholding given partnership 
principles have not been upheld.
 


                                                                                                                                                   

 Our dataset can be considered an unbalanced panel with donor-recipient-year combinations as units of obser-
vation.
6
 Assuming of course that the poverty outcomes are regarded by the donor as fully attributable to actions or 
inactions on the part of the recipient government.
7
 The scholarly discussion on whether the quality of recipient policies has driven donors to become more selec-
tive remains a debate (eg Hout, 2007a, 2007b; Nunnenkamp & Thiele, 2006; Clist, 2011). 
8
 All cases are taken from Sub-Saharan Africa, but this is appropriate given that this region accounts for the vast 
majority of suspension observations. 
9
 Credibility does not mean that donors have been consistent, but the fact that they have suspended does make 
threats to sanction a lot more credible.
10
 Note, however, that unlike some studies in the sanctions literature we did not consider the commitment-
disbursement differential (where committed BS amounts far exceed actual disbursed amounts, or the latter is 
simply zero) a reliable proxy for suspensions. This is because our breach-centered definition of a suspension 
relates to motivation, not just hard figures –i.e. a decrease in the expected BS flow can only be considered a 
suspension if it comes about as a result of donors reacting to what they see as undesirable behavior on the part of 
the recipient (and in that sense constitutes a sort of reminder of the conditional nature of the aid relationship and 
therefore carries with it a certain political charge). A significant proportion of the commitment-disbursement 
differential (which tends to be fairly large as a rule, certainly for bilateral donors –see for instance Svensson 
2003: 391) as well as year-to-year fluctuations in commitments can be explained by factors unrelated to actions 
on the part of the recipient (eg. donor administrative bottle-necks or changes in high level decisions in a donor 
agencies/ ministries related to allocation models, respectively) and one cannot tell by looking at the figures 
which factors apply where.
11
 A potential donor transparency bias is of less concern for our ‘recipient-factors’model as we explain BS 
suspensions in terms of variation of recipient-country variables.
12 One reviewer suggested that the trending variables are multicollinear with the year dummies.  However, the 
trending variables are not time invariant, they vary from year to year. Furthermore, they also  vary between reci-
pients in a given year. So there is no problem of perfect collinearity between the year dummies and the trending 
variables. 
 


                                                                                                                                                   
13
We have also estimated the model including a dummy coded one if a country held a seat at the UN Security 
Council. However, this variable did not significantly influence BS suspensions.
14
 We also ran our model including only recipient and recipient-year varying variables, hence including multila-
teral suspensions. Results – which are available upon request –  are similar to the findings of Table 1 and Table 
2. 
15
 Another way to correct for serial correlation is to estimate a so-called multi-level model. However, a fixed 
effects model with two-way clustered standard errors is a more robust and efficient way of determining which 
factors matter for aid suspensions.
16
The average number of suspensions per year is 11. In 2005, 24 budget support suspensions took place, almost 
1.7 standard deviations away from the mean.
17
Note however that large yearly increases and decreases in voice and accountability are uncommon; the stan-
dard deviation for trend in voice and accountability in our sample is only 0.11 and only in 17 countries voice and 
accountability decreased more than a quarter of a point.
18
 One reviewer suggested that substantive collinearity of the regressors might influence results. However, va-
riance inflation factors remain well below the critical threshold. VIF results are not reported but are available 
upon request.
  
Table 1: Dataset overview containing basic information on the suspensions captured 
Donor/RECIPIENT 
Total number of 
suspensions, all 
breach categories 
Total number of political 
suspensions (i.e. related to 
democracy and human 
rights issues, and 
corruption)  
Share total suspensions 
for this donor/recipient 
represents of all 
suspensions in our 
dataset 
UK (DfID) 26 22 20% 
Germany 17 13 13% 
EU 14 11 11% 
Netherlands 14 10 11% 
World Bank 12 8 9% 
Sweden 12 9 9% 
Norway 7 5 5% 
IMF 6 2 5% 
Denmark 5 3 4% 
Ireland 5 5 4% 
AfDB 3 2 2% 
US 3 3 2% 
Canada 2 2 2% 
Others 5 4 4% 
UGANDA 21 21 16% 
TANZANIA 17 16 13% 
MALAWI 14 7 11% 
NICARAGUA 11 5 8% 
ETHIOPIA 8 8 6% 
ZAMBIA 7 6 5% 
RWANDA 6 5 5% 
HONDURAS 6 4 5% 
MOZAMBIQUE 5 5 4% 
KENYA 4 4 3% 
MADAGASCAR 3 3 2% 
SIERRA LEONE 3 2 2% 
MALI 2 1 2% 
BENIN 2 1 2% 
CHAD 2 0 2% 
GHANA 2 0 2% 
IVORY COAST 2 0 2% 
OTHERS 16 11 12% 
 
   
Total 131 99 100% 
 
  
Table 2: List of variables used, short descriptions of these, and their sources 
Variable name Description Source 
Suspension Dummy coded 1 if donor i suspended budget support in recipient 
country j at year t 
$XWKRUV¶RZQFDOFXODWLRQ 
Nordic Plus Dummy coded 1 if donor is a member of the likeminded donors 
(Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway, United Kingdom, Ireland, The 
Netherlands) 
$XWKRUV¶RZQcalculation 
Multilateral suspension Dummy coded 1 if the World Bank, the African Development Bank, 
the Inter American Development Bank or the IMF suspended budget 
support in recipient country j at year t 
$XWKRUV¶RZQFDOFXODWLRQ 
Pub. support for Aid Index of public support for aid  Knack (2012) 
D GDP growth Donor annual GDP growth (in %)  World Development Indicators 
(WDI) 
D gov. ideology 3-point variable for ideology of executive party in donor country Beck et al. (2001)1 
Colonial tie Dummy coded 1 if there exists a colonial tie between donor and 
recipient  
IRIS Center, University of 
Maryland 
D aid share at t-1 'RQRUL¶VVKDUHLQWKHWRWDODPRXQWRIDLGUHFLSLHQWMUHFHLYHVDW\HDU
t-1 
Based on CRS  
Similar ideology Dummy coded 1 if donor and recipient have similar ideology Based on Beck et al (2001) 
Log of trade at t-1 The logarithm of the total value of imports and exports between 
donor and recipient at t-1 
Based on IMF DOTS 
Number of BS donors Number of budget support donors present in the recipient country $XWKRUV¶RZQFDOFXODWLRQEDVHG
on AidData 
Polity IV Index of Democracy Polity IV project 
Ethnic fractionalization Index of ethnic fractionalization Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 
(2005)  
Trend in government 
effectiveness 
Difference between government effectiveness at time t-1 and 
government effectiveness at time t 
Based on World Governance 
Indicators 
Trend in political stability Difference between political stability at time t-1 and political stability 
at time t 
Based on World Governance 
Indicators 
                                                          
1
 The Database of Political Institutions was constructed in 2001 and initially covered 177 countries for the period 1975±1995. The database 
is periodically updated: the most recent version dating to 2012 contains information from 1975 through 2012. 
  
Trend in voice and 
accountability 
Difference between voice and accountability at time t-1 and voice 
and accountability at time t 
Based on World Governance 
Indicators 
Trend in control of 
corruption 
Difference between control of corruption at time t-1 and control of 
corruption at time t 
Based on World Governance 
Indicators 
Aid over GNI at t-1 Total aid disbursed over GNI at year t-1 Based on CRS and WDI 
Share of BS at t-1 Share of aid as budget support at year t-1 Based on CRS and Aiddata 
log of R GDP/cap Logarithm of recipient country GDP per capita WDI 
log of R population Logarithm of recipient country population WDI 
 
  
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Suspension 0.066477 0.249232 0 1 
Nordic Plus 0.397911 0.489699 0 1 
Multilateral suspension 0.061728 0.240776 0 1 
Support for aid 0.10662 0.788864 -1.49068 1.995191 
Donor growth 1.752932 2.194483 -8.54 6.59 
Donor ideology 1.849003 0.943757 1 3 
Colonial tie 0.174739 0.379924 0 1 
Donor share of aid in R 0.075925 0.127387 0.00001 0.910433 
Similar ideology 0.190883 0.393184 0 1 
trade 18.44196 2.339326 9.860825 26.17719 
Number of BS donors 5.82716 3.901173 1 17 
Polity IV 3.817664 4.751725 -9 10 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.640685 0.259636 0.032 0.959 
Trend in gov effectiveness 0.001663 0.117826 -0.44938 1.080198 
Trend in political stability 0.007795 0.234362 -1.1357 0.999183 
Trend in voice and account 0.008355 0.12551 -0.67356 0.676371 
Trend in corruption 0.006522 0.145974 -0.5775 0.741061 
Aid dependence 0.070522 0.109858 0.000144 1.197012 
Share of aid as BS 0.189722 0.222137 0.000001 0.977008 
Log of per capita GDP 6.672124 0.983564 4.682131 9.277999 
Log of R population 16.80341 1.326266 13.03462 20.92212 
  
Table 4: Results for full sample 
 
Variation Base model R LPM R xtlogit D LPM D xtlogit excl 2005 dep var   
equation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)   
Nordic Plus 0.0422* . . 0.0229* 0.5816 0.0432* 0.0422**   
 
[0.0215]   [0.0123] [0.3570] [0.0251] [0.0208]   
Multilateral suspension 0.4582*** . . 0.4409*** 3.4737*** 0.3948*** 0.4210***   
 
[0.0607]   [0.0557] [0.4837] [0.0689] [0.0610]   
Donor public support for aid -0.0119 . . -0.0057 -0.2435 -0.0163** -0.011   
 
[0.0084]   [0.0055] [0.2911] [0.0083] [0.0078]   
Donor growth 0.0182*** . . 0.0122*** 0.4445*** 0.0159** 0.0172***   
 
[0.0062]   [0.0045] [0.1257] [0.0065] [0.0059]   
Donor ideology 0.0031 . . 0.0004 0.0525 -0.0048 0.0041   
 
[0.0070]   [0.0050] [0.1994] [0.0078] [0.0071]   
Colonial tie 0.0008 0.0258 0.8107 0.0027 0.2424 0.0083 0.0097   
 
[0.0214] [0.0225] [0.7867] [0.0151] [0.5402] [0.0239] [0.0206]   
Donor aid share in R -0.0238 0.0355 -2.549 -0.0012 1.8215 -0.0471 -0.0225   
 
[0.0436] [0.0450] [2.9085] [0.0271] [2.6339] [0.0461] [0.0394]   
Similar ideology -0.0364** -0.0485** -1.1978** -0.0339*** -1.0273** -0.0252 -0.0331**   
 
[0.0175] [0.0201] [0.5129] [0.0125] [0.4606] [0.0189] [0.0164]   
Log of trade 0.0088* -0.0052 -0.0264 0.0091*** 0.2584* 0.0098* 0.0079   
 
[0.0050] [0.0056] [0.2004] [0.0032] [0.1404] [0.0056] [0.0048]   
Number of BS donors 0.0058** 0.0147*** 0.2766*** . . 0.0056* 0.0044   
 
[0.0030] [0.0033] [0.0597]   [0.0032] [0.0029]   
Polity IV -0.0027* -0.0039** -0.0869** . . -0.0037** -0.0028**   
 
[0.0014] [0.0016] [0.0422]   [0.0016] [0.0013]   
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.0112 -0.0061 0.1867 . . -0.0105 0.011   
 
[0.0304] [0.0288] [0.7901]   [0.0335] [0.0290]   
Trend in gov effectiveness -0.0155 -0.0624 0.046 . . -0.0132 -0.0104   
 
[0.0503] [0.0545] [1.8194]   [0.0578] [0.0509]   
Trend in political stability 0.0205 0.0251 0.9989 . . 0.0212 0.0076   
 
[0.0208] [0.0237] [0.8412]   [0.0208] [0.0197]   
Trend in voice and account -0.0740* -0.1633*** -6.3660*** . . -0.0658 -0.0445   
 
[0.0380] [0.0499] [1.9875]   [0.0419] [0.0356]   
Trend in corruption 0.032 -0.0204 0.0291 . . 0.0551 0.035   
 
[0.0400] [0.0423] [1.3267]   [0.0476] [0.0387]   
Aid dependence -0.1150** -0.1913*** -6.9279* . . -0.1360*** -0.1096**   
 
[0.0485] [0.0526] [3.6583]   [0.0479] [0.0478]   
Share of BS in recipient 0.0032 0.0192 0.7551 . . 0.02 -0.0024   
 
[0.0393] [0.0373] [0.9145]   [0.0421] [0.0368]   
Log of R per capita GDP -0.0179* -0.0009 -0.4099 . . -0.0219** -0.0183**   
 
[0.0095] [0.0105] [0.3676]   [0.0109] [0.0093]   
Log of R population -0.0112** -0.0066 -0.4969 . . -0.0115* -0.0086   
 
[0.0056] [0.0061] [0.3165]   [0.0061] [0.0053]   
Country fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No   
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   
Observations 1053 1102 667 1846 773 893 1053   
R² 0.292 0.1724 . 0.4144 . 0.2226 0.2761   
Adjusted R² 0.2726 0.1339 . 0.3648 . 0.1984 0.2563   
p-value F-statistic 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.0000 0.0000   
  
Dependent variable is a dummy coded 1 if donor i suspended budget support in recipient country j at year t. The standard errors for the OLS models are 
adjusted for non-independence within both donor and recipient clusters. The standard errors for the conditional logit models are based on the observed 
information matrix. Constant not reported. Significance levels:*** p<0.01. ** p<0.05 and * p<0.10 
  
Table 5: Results from a restricted sample of suspensions related to political factors  
Variation Base model R LPM R xtlogit D LPM D xtlogit excl 2005 dep var 
equation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Nordic Plus 0.0324* . . 0.0153 0.4653 0.0334 0.0291 
 
[0.0192]   [0.0107] [0.3996] [0.0235] [0.0192] 
Multilateral suspension 0.4369*** . . 0.4008*** 3.4647*** 0.4074*** 0.4257*** 
 
[0.0630]   [0.0594] [0.5356] [0.0694] [0.0630] 
Public support for aid -0.0058 . . -0.0038 -0.0935 -0.0102 -0.0049 
 
[0.0079]   [0.0050] [0.3138] [0.0079] [0.0077] 
Donor growth 0.0152** . . 0.0102** 0.4347*** 0.0127** 0.0139** 
 
[0.0059]   [0.0042] [0.1377] [0.0062] [0.0058] 
Donor ideology 0.005 . . 0.0007 0.0352 -0.0004 0.0072 
 
[0.0067]   [0.0046] [0.2302] [0.0076] [0.0067] 
Colonial tie -0.0043 0.0166 0.1966 0.0042 0.3069 0.0054 -0.0024 
 
[0.0190] [0.0220] [0.8482] [0.0144] [0.6001] [0.0210] [0.0190] 
Donor aid share in R 0.004 0.0448 -4.0451 0.0122 4.6865 -0.0094 0.0123 
 
[0.0385] [0.0407] [4.1660] [0.0226] [3.4186] [0.0419] [0.0366] 
Similar ideology -0.0295* -0.0366* -1.1252* -0.0261** -1.0189* -0.0267 -0.026 
 
[0.0167] [0.0196] [0.5775] [0.0110] [0.5393] [0.0189] [0.0165] 
Log of trade 0.0065 -0.0055 -0.1324 0.0072** 0.2368 0.007 0.0056 
 
[0.0046] [0.0051] [0.2385] [0.0029] [0.1572] [0.0053] [0.0046] 
Number of BS donors 0.0052* 0.0126*** 0.2728*** . . 0.0060* 0.0044 
 
[0.0028] [0.0031] [0.0703]   [0.0031] [0.0029] 
Polity IV -0.0036*** -0.0049*** -0.1180** . . -0.0039*** -0.0034*** 
 
[0.0013] [0.0015] [0.0487]   [0.0015] [0.0013] 
Ethnic fractionalization -0.0117 -0.0004 0.6772 . . -0.0172 -0.0023 
 
[0.0298] [0.0282] [0.9151]   [0.0337] [0.0291] 
Trend in gov. effectiveness -0.0605* -0.1090** -2.9601 . . -0.0519 -0.0533 
 
[0.0365] [0.0436] [2.2855]   [0.0413] [0.0359] 
Trend in political stability 0.0131 0.0127 0.6762 . . 0.0203 0.0049 
 
[0.0196] [0.0224] [0.9769]   [0.0203] [0.0193] 
Trend in voice and account -0.0538 -0.1119*** -6.1828*** . . -0.0702* -0.0456 
 
[0.0332] [0.0403] [2.3962]   [0.0371] [0.0321] 
Trend in corruption 0.0487 0.0169 1.4738 . . 0.0505 0.048 
 
[0.0328] [0.0342] [1.5654]   [0.0402] [0.0322] 
Aid dependence -0.1188*** -0.2007*** -12.5528** . . -0.1227*** -0.1101*** 
 
[0.0422] [0.0479] [4.9892]   [0.0428] [0.0415] 
Share of BS in recipient 0.0161 0.0386 1.6787* . . 0.0205 0.0129 
 
[0.0373] [0.0355] [1.0076]   [0.0408] [0.0362] 
Log of R per capita GDP -0.0158* -0.0036 -0.7065 . . -0.0166 -0.0157* 
 
[0.0091] [0.0100] [0.4571]   [0.0107] [0.0090] 
Log of R population -0.0062 -0.0019 -0.3977 . . -0.0064 -0.0042 
 
[0.0050] [0.0056] [0.3749]   [0.0056] [0.0048] 
Country fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1041 1089 629 1829 636 886 1041 
R² 0.2986 0.1654 . 0.4237 . 0.2432 0.2934 
Adjusted R² 0.2792 0.126 . 0.3744 . 0.2194 0.2738 
p-value F-statistic 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  
Dependent variable is a dummy coded 1 if donor i suspended budget support in recipient country j at year t for 
political reasons. The standard errors for the OLS models are adjusted for non-independence within both donor 
and recipient clusters. The standard errors for the conditional logit models are based on the observed 
information matrix. Constant not reported. Significance levels:*** p<0.01. ** p<0.05 and * p<0.10  
We would like to thank the reviewer for their final comments. We went over all of them (they 
are repeated in bold below) and made the necessary adjustments where we felt this improved 
the paper. A list of each individual point can be found below: 
On. p.9, is "allowed to do" the right way of expressing this? Are they restricted by 
domestic law? Yes, this is the sense in which the sentence was intended. For the sake of 
clarity we have now added ³LQ terms of their SURFHGXUHV´ to the sentence in question.  
 
Spell out DfID when first used. We have now done so. 
 
I am confused by the inclusion of a trend in corruption and footnote 17. Given that the 
trend does not vary within recipients and years, it must be multicollinear with the year 
dummies. Including them jointly would then be impossible. I assume the estimation is 
performed by omitting one of the year dummies instead. This makes no sense. We have 
included a new endnote (endnote 13) which provides more information on our trending 
variables. It reads, ³2QH reviewer suggested that the trending variables are multicollinear with 
the year dummies.  However, the trending variables are not time invariant, they vary from 
year to year. Furthermore, they also  vary between recipients in a given year. So there is no 
problem of perfect collinearity between the year dummies and the trending YDULDEOHV´  
p.19, typo in "donors active in" The sentence is in fact grammatical and should be read as 
follows ?That is, the more [budget support donors] active in a country, the more diffused the 
encompassing interest in a country's development?, but we have now changed it to ?That is, 
the more budget support donors that are active in a country, the more diffused the 
encompassing interest in a country's development? to improve the ease of reading ; p.20 
Eaton an Engers, period missing in endnote 2, typo in endnote 6. These three errors have 
all been amended. 
 
Regarding UNSC membership (footnote 12), I would stress this more and certainly also 
test for UNGA voting. The former is one of the most clearly exogenous variables and 
used in most recent aid allocation models, the latter is one of the most widely used 
variables in this literature. It seems weird to exclude it. Our findings on UNSC voting and 
their significance are described in the footnote referred to. Since we only have useable UNGA 
data till 2008 (which GRHVQ¶W cover the full period we examine in this paper) we were unable 
to include this variable, though we will bear it in mind for future work if data availability 
changes. 
 
Tables 3 and 4 use commas where they should use periods. These tables have been 
amended (as has Table 5, for the sake of consistency), and all commas replaced by full stops 
(periods). There was no information on the requirements in this regard in the World 
Development style guide 
(http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/386?generatepdf=true), but 
we assume the UHYLHZHU¶s suggestion is fully in line with World Development editing 
guidelines. 
